What I see at this point as possibly the most important aspect in this digital horn-locking battle is the fog surrounding “the ostensible reason for Google’s change of posture.” It is not clear what really happened and why things have unfolded as they have. Here in China it is being spun as a timing issue: Google going public to whip up world sentiment and support in the lead-up to SecState’s Clinton’s ‘”internet freedom” speech, and now she is being portrayed, in effect, as Google’s Foreign Minister. There were interactions between Google and State before Google went public, which is being seen as collusive. What those discussions were in regard to is unclear and open for a variety of interpretations.

Was the hack a national security concern or was it a private company vs a foreign government issue? If it was the former, then it’s a whole different ball game than the latter. As I’ve pointed out before, at the New America Foundation Authority, Meet Technology: Will China’s Great Firewall Hold?, the day before SecState Clinton’s “internet freedom” speech, State Dept. Senior Advisor for Innovation and one of the architect’s the speech, Alec Ross, claimed that they were dealing with the Google/China dispute as a private company vs foreign government problem, which seems to say that it was not a national security issue. He also said that the State Department was not Google’s foreign policy wing, or something to that effect. Not only do I find that line unconvincing, but I am also not willing to go the “my country right or wrong” route on this one (or any issue, really, since I believe that the level of controls China holds on its internet China is one that that the Bush/Cheney administration would have been quite happy with), which is to say that I think Ross’ veracity is suspect, hardly the first time I’ve questioned the statements of a public official. There is a lot of slippery slope stuff going on here, and everyone’s trying their best to not let anything spill for fear that the whole mountainside may slide off into the sea.

But who are the parties at the table? Well, Google and China, obviously, but what about the State Department? I think it’s fair to assume that they are chin-deep in the thick of it all. The US Embassy has had at least two sessions with bloggers at the Embassy: one the day before Clinton’s speech, for foreign bloggers (and no, they didn’t invite me), and another the day after the speech with Chinese bloggers. They are quite obviously trying their best to get the right spin on this pitch – especially in the wake of the speech – to get this one over the plate. Knuckleball? Too soon to tell.

There is much at stake here that goes far beyond the immediate flare-up, which obviously makes this more than a private company vs foreign country clash. If there were not, as Ross implied, a national security component to the murky hack, then why do they appear  to be so deep in the middle of this? Well, for a variety of reasons, one of them clearly being national security, which makes them major stakeholders in the outcome. This is fundamentally a clash between dueling ‘capitalisms’, with the U.S. becoming more open and aggressive aligning with and protecting corporate interests (privacy information and intellectual property), since national security is, has been, or may possibly be compromised by aggressive states, i.e, China, engaging in cyber attacks on private companies that do business with the federal government. Google is one of those companies. Let’s also not forget that a lot of state-run companies in China are owned by the military, since the military is part of the “get rich is glorious” free market system scheme. Many of the Chinese businessmen who sit at the dealing tables around the world have strings that reach back to people who also happen to command armies. This is about a lot more than blocked internet sites. Amazingly China is still spinning it as a pornography issue on local radios, which speaks to the utter bottomlessness of their domestic deceit.

Until we know more, it is not possible to make an informed decision, which is quite ironic, since the argument is about information freedom, though neither side is forthcoming with any. The Chinese authorities have a history of being uninformative, so at least they are remaining consistent. Google, on the other hand, has staked out a moral high ground based on the open access ideal (which is not as open as they are currently permitted to be in China), but they have done nothing but tease in this issue while remaining silent and “in discussions” with Chinese authorities. And where is the State Dept. in all of this, if it is, as Ross insinuated, not their business? What really happened in the last two months, and what is currently happening? Good questions. It would be nice to be informed. It seems to me that each day of silence works against Google, especially if they come out of it staying in the Chinese market in any form or neo-evolution.

There is so very much that is still unclear, and I have the feeling that it will remain so, at least for as long as the parties are talking. And possibly a lot longer if they reach some sort of deal. But the onus will be on Google to cough up the facts, since they are the ones claiming the high ground mandate. I cannot imagine that there will be any settlement that China will sign off on that doesn’t include some sort of non-disclosure clause. Will Google be able to live with that in the wider international community? My guess is that they will not. That would be seen as “being evil” and they have a lot invested in the “Don’t be evil” mantra. So, if there is a favorable settlement, you can bet that Google will be on the hot seat, as well they should be. There is more than a fair chance that Google may come out of this smelling like the proverbial south end of a northbound mule. In my opinion each day that goes by without any news coming from behind the closed doors, is another day that Google takes a negative hit.

When Google came to China they hopped in bed with a partner who knows quite well how to work all the positions between the sheets. There are varying opinions on their 2006 move into China. Some see it as a move from “don’t be evil” to “don’t be too evil if it makes a lot of money.” Though I won’t go that far, I do believe that they knew what they were getting into. And if they didn’t, they should have. The Google person to watch in the coming weeks is Sergey Brin, who was opposed to the move into China. If there is any compromising crack in Google’s shiny armor in their negotiations with the Chinese government I suspect that there would be some sort of action or movement from Brin. And you can bet that China knows this. If anything, their “5,000 years” has honed their skills at “divide and conquer,” which I would imagine is what they are trying to do here. A few days ago a re-tweet of an original GE_Anderson tweet showed up on my Twitter page: “China loves the concept of win-win: it means they get to win twice.” Indeed it does.
________

Update: January 25, 920 AM (+8 UTC)
I recommend that you have a look at this from CNN (h/t @evgenymorozov on Twitter): U.S. enables Chinese hacking of Google. “In order to comply with government search warrants on user data, Google created a backdoor access system into Gmail accounts. This feature is what the Chinese hackers exploited to gain access.” It’s beginning to sound like a little more than just a private company vs. foreign government fluff-up. Maybe it’s even a national security issue. A secret entrance created by Google to assist info mining of Google users by US security agencies. I’m … abashed! And which also allowed Chinese hackers – or any hackers for that matter – to gain access to sensitive data, the very sort of data that Google says was hacked? If this is actually the case, Google’s going to have to change their unofficial motto to “Let’s try not to be too stupid.”

In the aftermath of Google’s announcement, some members of Congress are reviving a bill banning U.S. tech companies from working with governments that digitally spy on their citizens. Presumably, those legislators don’t understand that their own government is on the list.

This might explain the continuing silence coming from who knows how many camps. Could it be as simple as Google leaving a side door open thinking that it would remain a secret?

This is looking more like the whining child in the backseat on long, long trip scenario:
“Are we there yet, Papa?”
“No, kid, but we’re getting closer.”
“How much loooonger?”
“Pretty soon, kid. Pretty soon.”

As the assessments are rolling in, it is curious that almost all of them, even those praising the speech, can’t really lay a finger on what it really means. Perhaps that’s the nature of “major foreign policy” speeches announcing what I naively assume would be clear policy shifts, and, if not shifts then clarifications of policy fuzziness. I stepped away from the audio feed last night shaking my head – a head, I might add, that is still shaking.

There has been much written on China, the internet and Google’s “we’re not going to take it anymore” wavy line in the sand. I wonder how long it will be before it gets a bit more straightened out? I have been paying particular attention to three people who have long-established credibility and knowledge of the issues involved in China and/or global political issues concerning the internet: Rebecca MacKinnon, James Fallows and Evgeny Morozov. Though Morozov is not as intimately familiar with China as MacKinnon and Fallows, he has been heavily involved with issues affecting the “Internet’s impact on global politics.”) Each of them were involved in the New American Foundation’s discussion Authority, Meet Technology: Will China’s Great Firewall Hold? the day before SecState Clinton delivered her speech, which I wrote about here.  As expected, each of them has already weighed in on Clinton’s speech, though I expect that they will address it again:
Fallows: A momentous 40 hours, leading to Clinton/China/Internet; (updated) More on Hillary’s speech
MacKinnon: Clinton speaks on Internet freedom
Morozov: Is Hillary Clinton launching a cyber Cold War?

I am not going to get into a critique of their initial takes on the speech, but I do encourage you to read them. I wrote yesterday here: “I am not hopeful of anything but ‘more of the same,’ but I also hope I am very wrong. If I am, I am quite willing to say so here tomorrow.” Well, I am not willing to say that yesterday’s prognostication was wrong. Again, it is too soon to make any judgment, since both specific solutions and realistically projected outcomes were lacking in the speech. I said last night at the conclusion of the speech that it felt like a lot of big and very fluffy pillows being thrown around, and my view has not changed over the last 12 hours. I feel solidly in Morozov’s corner, and if you read his post you’ll understand why I do not see this speech as much more than what we’ve seen before: a political show of hope that is, at this point, toothless. From Morozov: “Overall, I was disappointed with the speech — it lacked depth. I didn’t sense any coherent intellectual vision underpinning the State Department’s digital strategy.”

Regarding China: Fallows mentions that “Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Egypt — this is not the grouping of countries that the Chinese government, in its recent sense of rise to superpower status, is used to being lumped with.” Good point, but not, at this point, news. That it is coming from the U.S. SecState in a high profile, public speech is, or better yet, was, since this statement could not have caught Zhongnanhai by surprise, especially after the week they’ve just had. If Google had not pulled the rug from under their feet last week, I think they would be spinning at the moment, but it’s fair to say that they were steeled for this.

One last point: NGO, for better or worse, connotes “good work, low pay, planet/people love, etc.” It’s a term that conjures up “the good fight.”  For anyone whose eyes still water when they hear the term, I would like you to know that the Chinese government is on to this, and they have done their very best to not only de-fang foreign NGOs within their borders – especially in the contentious Tibetan areas – but they’ve also learned that the term equates to money. Over the last several years there has been a dramatic rise in domestic, homespun NGOs within China, most of which have been corralled into obeisance by “unofficial’ oversight. When there is money involved, you can rest assured that the government controls the gate to anyone who wants to swim in that pool. (For a look at how a clean drinking water project in Qinghai province was capitalized upon by the local government, have a look here.) Each time SecState Clinton mentioned NGOs last night I rolled my eyes. I kept imagining Chinese locals in the countryside with mobile devices digitally assessing the CCP in collective village meetings where everyone’s grading codes would be checked as they pushed the ‘enter’ button. And all under the watchful eye of Chinese NGOs.